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2Abstract
This article is the first to explore whether the marital communications privilege, which 
protects from disclosure private communications between spouses, should attach to 
communication sent via Web-based email.  Traditionally, the privilege does not attach where a 
third party learns, either intentionally or inadvertently, the content of an otherwise private 
communication.  In the world of Web-based email, disclosure to a third party is necessary in 
order for successful communication to occur.  Writers of Web-based email draft a message and 
store it on a third-party Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) server until the recipient reads the 
message.  Even after the email has been delivered, a copy may remain on the ISP’s server 
indefinitely.  This article investigates whether this process is inherently at odds with the marital 
communications privilege.  This article will also explore whether marital communications should 
continue to be protected despite the privilege’s failure to meet some of its stated purposes.   
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Introduction
Consider the following hypothetical (“Hypothetical #1):  Harold Smith has just 
committed a homicide.  Harold’s boss discovered that he had been embezzling his company’s 
money for the past two years.  When Harold’s boss confronted him, Harold became violent and 
shot his boss with the handgun Harold keeps in his desk drawer.  Harold is now on the run.  He 
purchased an airline ticket to Mexico City, Mexico.  Once he arrived in Mexico City, he wrote a 
letter to his wife explaining what had happened.  Harold mailed the letter to his wife with no 
return address.  Wendy, Harold’s wife, received the letter three days after learning that Harold 
was wanted for murder.  When police officers arrived at Wendy’s home to question her, she 
admitted that she had received a letter from her husband.  However, Wendy refused to disclose 
the contents of the letter because her attorney advised her that the marital communications 
privilege would protect any communications between Harold and Wendy.  Despite the police 
officers’ best efforts, they are unable to learn the contents of the letter. 
 Now, consider the following hypothetical (“Hypothetical #2”):  The facts are identical to 
those of Hypothetical #1 with one significant change.  Rather than writing Wendy a letter, 
Harold visits an internet café in Mexico City and sends Wendy an email from his Hotmail 
account to her Hotmail account.  During the police officers’ questioning of Wendy, she admits 
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4that she received an email from Harold, but she refuses to disclose the contents of the email.  Not 
to be deterred, the police officers contact the assistant District Attorney on the case and explain 
the situation.  The assistant D.A. prepares a subpoena directed to Microsoft, the operator of 
Hotmail.  The subpoena demands production of any emails sent between Harold’s account and 
Wendy’s account during the week following the homicide.  Microsoft complies with the 
subpoena and produces the emails, which are stored on a server owned by Microsoft.   
 Most would agree that the marital communications privilege protects the communication 
between Harold and Wendy as described in Hypothetical #1.  However, the change in the form 
of communication, as described in Hypothetical #2, could affect application of the privilege.  
This article will take a fresh and innovative look at whether the marital communication privilege 
should protect communications between husband and wife sent via electronic means.   
Traditionally, the marital communications privilege is destroyed where a third party, 
without the knowledge of or involvement by the recipient-spouse,1 intentionally or inadvertently 
discovers the communication.2 In the context of electronic communication,3 where Internet 
Service Providers have access to otherwise confidential communications, the marital 
communications privilege may not apply at all.  Indeed, it could be argued that the marital 
communications privilege is inherently at odds with this form of communication.   
This article has two purposes.  First, it will explore whether the marital communications 
privilege currently protects email communication and whether the privilege should protect such 
communication.  Second, it will address whether the marital communications privilege should 
continue to exist considering the traditional purposes of the privilege.  Part I of the article will 
 
1 A “recipient-spouse” is defined as the spouse who receives the communication from the “communicating spouse”. 
2 See infra notes 22 through 23 and accompanying text. 
3 “Electronic communication” is limited, for purposes of this article, to electronic mail.  Other forms of electronic 
communication, including text messaging, instant messaging and cellular phone conversations are outside the 
purview of this article. 
5discuss the history of the marital communications privilege.  Part II will explore the details of 
email storage and address constitutional and statutory provisions outside the context of the 
marital communications privilege that provide some privacy protection for electronic 
communications.  Part III of the article will take a critical look at whether the marital 
communications privilege applies to electronic communication based on more traditional 
applications of the privilege and highlight three legislative solutions that have been put in place 
to protect privileged communications made electronically.  Part IV will discuss whether courts 
should reconsider the marital communications privilege as a whole considering the stated 
purposes of the privilege.  Part V of the article will provide a conclusion. 
I. The History of the Marital Communications Privilege 
 The marital privilege has two parts:  the testimonial privilege and the communications 
privilege.  Originally, the testimonial privilege prevented one spouse from testifying against 
another.  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the rule was borne of two canons of medieval 
jurisprudence:  “[F]irst, the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in his own behalf 
because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the concept that husband and wife were one, 
and that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that 
one.”4 Thus, if a husband were not permitted to testify, then his wife, as a part of the husband, 
likewise should not be permitted to testify.5
4 Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1979).  See also John T. Hundley, “Inadvertent Waiver” of Evidentiary 
Privileges:  Can Reformulating the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19 S. Ill. U. L. J. 263, 265 n.8 
(comparing application of the original testimonial privilege to cases holding the testimony of slaves inadmissible 
against their masters).   
5 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.  See also People v. Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d 43, 55 (Mich. 1989) (Boyle, J., dissenting) 
(“The marital privileges can be traced to the period of our history when a woman, possessing no legal identity of her 
own, was treated as the chattel of her husband.”).   
6In 1933, the U.S. Supreme Court abolished the rule disqualifying spouses from testifying 
in each other’s behalf;6 however, a privilege remained that prevented either spouse from 
providing adverse testimony against the other.7 The rationale for the testimonial privilege is its 
role in protecting marital harmony and the sanctity of the marital relationship.8 In Hawkins v.
U.S., the Court held that the testimonial privilege prevented one spouse from testifying adversely 
against the other regardless of whether the testimony was voluntary or compelled by the 
government.9 Over 20 years later, in Trammel v. U.S., the Court held that the testimonial 
privilege, as applied in the federal courts, should vest in the witness-spouse alone, thereby 
allowing the witness-spouse to voluntarily provide adverse testimony against the defendant-
spouse.10 
The communications privilege was expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in 1934.11 
In Wolfe v. U.S., the Court noted that the purpose of the privilege is to protect “marital 
confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to 
outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege entails.”12 The 
 
6 Funk v. U.S., 290 U.S. 371, 386-87.  In Funk, the Court noted a major change in the common law in that 
defendants are no longer disqualified from testifying in their own behalf.  Thus, “a refusal to permit the wife upon 
the ground of interest to testify in behalf of her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to testify 
for himself, presents a manifest incongruity.”  Id. at 381.  According to the Court in Funk, any risk of bias or interest 
on the part of the witness-spouse could be reduced through the use of cross-examination, making the issue of bias an 
issue of credibility rather than competency to testify.  Id. at 380.   
7 Id. at 373.  See also Hawkins v. U.S., 358 U.S. 74, 76 (1958) (“The Funk case . . . did not criticize the phase of the 
common-law rule which allowed either spouse to exclude adverse testimony by the other, but left this question open 
to further scrutiny.”). 
8 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.  As the Court noted in Hawkins, “[t]he basic reason the law has refused to pit wife 
against husband or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy was 
necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the 
public as well.”  358 U.S. at 77.        
9 358 U.S. at 77-79.  The Hawkins Court found that “the law should not force or encourage testimony which might 
alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences.”  Id. at 79.   
10 445 U.S. at 53.  The Court reasoned that where one spouse is willing to provide adverse testimony against the 
other spouse, “their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital 
harmony for the privilege to preserve.”  Id. at 52.       
11 See Wolfe v. U.S., 291 U.S. 7.   
12 Id. at 14.  See also Anne N. DePrez, Note, Pillow Talk, Grimgribbers and Connubial Bliss:  The Marital 
Communication Privilege, 56 Ind. L. J. 121, 127 (1980) (stating that a second rationale for the communications 
7purpose of the marital communications privilege is very similar to purposes of the other 
evidentiary privileges recognized by the courts, including the privileges between attorney and 
client, physician and patient, psychotherapist and patient, and clergy and communicant, in that 
each of these privileges is “rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.”13 
Thus, communications between spouses are presumptively confidential, and any party 
seeking to introduce such communications into evidence must overcome the presumption by 
establishing facts which show a lack of confidentiality.14 One way to overcome the presumption 
is to show that the communication was made in the presence of a third party.15 In Wolfe, the 
government sought to introduce into evidence a letter written by the Petitioner to his wife.  
Although this type of communication would normally be protected by the privilege, the 
government argued that Petitioner’s utilization of his personal stenographer to write the letter 
prevented the marital communications privilege from attaching.16 The government sought to 
introduce the contents of the letter not through the testimony of the wife, but through the 
stenographer, who had kept her notes.  The government argued that communications between 
spouses are not privileged if proof of the content of the communications can be made by a 
witness who is neither the husband nor the wife.17 The Court agreed, holding that the privilege 
 
privilege “is that society finds it naturally repugnant to observe a wife being forced to reveal her husband’s marital 
confidences on the witness stand.”).   
13 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (“The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual 
counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly 
consolation and guidance in return.  The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to 
know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.  
Similarly, the physician must know all that a patient can articulate in order to identify and to treat disease; barriers to 
full disclosure would impair diagnosis and treatment.”).   
14 Wolfe, 291 U.S. at 14; accord Pereira v. U.S., 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (“Although marital communications are 
presumed to be confidential, that presumption may be overcome by proof of facts showing that they were not 
intended to be private.”); Blau v. U.S., 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951). 
15 Wolfe, 291 U.S. at 14. 
16 Id. at 13. 
17 Id.
8did not prevent disclosure of the contents of the letter.18 According to the Court, disclosure to 
the stenographer was voluntary and unnecessary.  Thus, the Petitioner’s decision to reveal the 
communication to a third party destroyed any privilege that would have otherwise attached to the 
communication.19 
This rule (hereinafter the “third party presence rule”) is in accord with the courts’ desire 
to construe the privilege narrowly due to its role in “obstruct[ing] the truth-seeking process.”20 
Additionally, while the purpose of the communications privilege is the preservation of marital 
confidences, courts reason that this purpose is not thwarted if the communication can be brought 
into evidence through a third party.21 It is important to note that there is only one circumstance 
where the privilege will attach despite disclosure to a third party outside the marriage.  
Attachment of the privilege will occur when the recipient-spouse intentionally discloses the 
communication to the third party.22 Where the recipient-spouse colludes with a third party to 
betray the trust of the communicating spouse, courts seek to protect the trust upon which the 
communicating spouse relied in confiding in his or her spouse.23 
Many commentators have criticized the communications privilege,24 with some arguing 
that courts should abandon the privilege entirely.25 Opponents of the privilege argue that it 
 
18 Id. at 17.   
19 Id. at 17.  In support of its holding, the Court cited cases finding that communications between spouses voluntarily 
made in the presence of their children or other family members are not privileged.  Id. (citing Linnell v. Linnell, 143 
N.E. 813 (Mass. 1924); Cowser v. State, 157 S.W. 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913); Fuller v. Fuller, 130 S.E. 270 
(W.Va. 1925)). 
20 U.S. v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1990).        
21 See State of Kansas v. Myers, 640 P.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Kan. 1982) (finding that the third party presence rule 
assists in the discovery of the truth while protecting confidential communications between husband and wife). 
22 See e.g., id., 640 P.2d at 1248 (citing 8 Wigmore EVIDENCE § 2339 (3rd. ed. 1940)). 
23 See Yokie v. State of Florida, 773 So.2d 115, 117 (Fla. 2000).  In Yokie, the defendant’s wife allowed police 
officers to come into her home and listen in on her telephone conversations with her husband.  The court held that 
the communications privilege would attach to the phone conversations even though a third party was present, 
because the defendant’s wife had, “with the state’s encouragement, betrayed the trust that the privilege is designed 
to protect by deliberating misleading [Defendant] into feeling safe in making the otherwise privileged disclosures.”  
Id.
24 See, e.g., People v. Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d at 56 (noting that both marital privileges have been highly criticized). 
9blocks the truth-seeking process while failing to adequately promote marital harmony.26 Others 
have argued that the communications privilege “perpetuate[s] the role of male domination in the 
marriage” because the privilege is usually invoked by a husband to prevent his wife’s disclosure 
of confidential communications, thereby benefiting men more often than women.27 Finally, 
opponents of the privilege have argued that the privilege is unnecessary, considering the fact that 
most married couples are unaware of its existence.28 The Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence apparently agreed with this criticism of the 
communications privilege.  The Committee drafted proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, 
which codified the testimonial privilege but failed to mention the communications privilege.29 In 
the Advisory Committee Notes following the proposed Rule, the Committee stated that the 
communications privilege was not recognized by Rule 505 because it could not be assumed that 
marital conduct would be influenced by a privilege “of whose existence the parties in all 
likelihood are unaware.”30 The Committee reasoned that, unlike the other evidentiary privileges, 
there is no professional party in the marital relationship who can advise the communicating party 
of the existence of the privilege.31 Congress rejected proposed Rule 505 along with eight other 
proposed rules that would have codified various evidentiary privileges32 and enacted Rule 501, 
 
25 See generally DePrez, supra note 12.  DePrez argues that the marital communications privilege, in its current 
form, should be abandoned and replaced with a privilege that protects confidential communications between spouses 
only to the extent such communications are protected by the constitutional right to privacy.  Id. at 149.   
26 See McCormick, EVIDENCE § 86 (3d ed.) (stating that “while the danger of injustice from suppression of relevant 
proof is clear and certain, the probable benefits of the rule of privilege in encouraging marital confidences and 
wedded harmony is at best doubtful and marginal.”).   
27 People v. Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d at 56, n. 5.   
28 See DePrez, supra note 12, at 136. 
29 See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505.   
30 See Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 505, Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 244, 246.   
31 Id.
32 See Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 502 (required reports privilege); Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 503 (attorney-client 
privilege); Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 504 (psychotherapist-patient privilege); Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 505 (spousal 
testimonial privilege); Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 506 (clergy-communicant privilege); Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 
507 (political vote privilege); Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 508 (trade secrets privilege); Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 509 
(secrets of state privilege); Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 510 (identify of informant privilege). 
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which was intended to “provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a 
case-by-case basis.”33 
Despite criticism of the rule, the marital communications privilege is quite prevalent.   
The privilege is codified in 49 states and the District of Columbia.34 At the federal level, 
although the marital communications privilege is not codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the privilege is a part of federal common law.35 Additionally, courts in 47 states and the District 
of Columbia have held that the presence of a third party destroys any privilege that might attach 
to a communication between spouses.36 
33 120 Cong.Rec. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate) (quoted in Trammel v. U.S., supra note _, at 911).   
34 See Al. R. Evid. Rule 504 (West 2006); Ak. R. Rev. Rule 505 (West 2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2232 
(West 2006); Ar. R. Rev. Rule 504 (West 2006); Cal. Evid. Code § 917(a) (West 2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
90-107 (West 2006); De. R. Rev. Rule 504 (West 2006); D.C. Code Ann. § 14-306 (West 2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
90.504 (West 2006); Ga. Code. Ann. § 24-9-21(1) (West 2006); Hi. R. Rev. Rule 505 (West 2006); Id. Code Ann. § 
9-203.1 (West 2006); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-801 (West 2006); In. Code Ann. § 34-46-3-1(4) (West 2006); 
Iowa Code Ann. § 622.9 (West 2006); Kan. Stat. Ann.  § 60-428 (2005);  Ky. R. Evid. Rule 504 (West 2006); La. 
Code Evid. Ann. art. 504 (West 2006); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 1315 (West 2006); Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. § 9-105 (West 2006); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233 § 20 (West 2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 
600.2162(7) (West 2006); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02(a) (West 2006); Ms. R. Rev. Rule 504 (West 2006);  Mo. Ann. 
Stat. § 546.260 (West 2006); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-802 (2006); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505 (2006); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 49.295 (West 2006);  N.H. R. Rev. Rule 504 (West 2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-22 (West 2006); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 38-6-6(A) (West 2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4502 (McKinney 2006); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-57(c) (West 
2006); N.D. R. Rev. Rule 504 (West 2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.42 (West 2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 
2504 (West 2006); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40.255 (West 2006); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5914 (West 2006); R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 9-17-13 (2005); S.C. Code Ann.  § 19-11-30 (2005); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-13-13 (2006); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 24-1-201 (West 2006); Tex. Rule Evid. 504 (2006); Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1) (West 2006); Vt. R. Evid. 
Rule 504 (West 2006); Va. Code. Ann. § 19.2-271.2 (West 2006); Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060(1) (West 2006); W. 
Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-4 (West 2006); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.05 (West 2006); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-104 (2005).  
Connecticut has not codified the marital communications privilege; however, its courts recognize the  privilege and 
have found that it is a “fixture of [Connecticut] common law.”  State of Connecticut v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 
1173 (Conn. 2004). 
35 See Fed. R. Evid. 501 (stating that the law on evidentiary privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.”).  
See also S.E.C. v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The federal common law recognizes two types of 
marital privileges: the privilege against adverse spousal testimony and the confidential marital communications 
privilege.”).  Accord U.S. v. Hook, 781 F.3d 1166, 1173 n.11 (6th Cir. 1986).  
36 See Arnold v. State, 353 So.2d 524, 527 (Ala. 1977); State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686, 694-95 (Ariz. 1984); 
Metcalf v. State, 681 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Ark. 1984); People v. Gaines, 375 P.2d 296, 300 (Cal. 1962), overruled on 
other grounds by People v. Morse, 388 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964); Thrap v. People, 558 P.2d 576, 578 (Colo. 1977); State 
v. Christian, supra note _, at 1178; Weedon v. State, 647 A.2d 1078, 1081 (Del. 1994); Beard v. U.S., 535 A.2d 
1373, 1381 (D.C. 1988); Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 464 (Fla. 1975); Williams v. State, 77 S.E. 818, 818 (Ga. 
1913); State v. Levi, 686 P.2d 9, 11 (Haw. 1984); State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174, 182 (Idaho 1998); People v. 
Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 (Ill. 1983); Holt v. State, 481 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Ind. 1985); State v. Countryman,
572 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Iowa 1997); State v. Myers, 640 P.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Kan. 1982); Ewing v. May, 705 
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II. Web-Based Electronic Mail 
 This article will analyze the marital communications privilege as it relates to Web-based 
email.37 Web-based email is sent from the writer to the recipient by means of a third party 
server.38 These third parties, who store and process a user’s emails, are called Internet Service 
Providers (“(ISPs”).39 Rather than accessing an email by downloading it onto his or her personal 
computer, a user of Web-based email can access the email from any computer via the World 
Wide Web.40 The email message sits on the ISP’s server for an undetermined amount of time, 
sometimes even after the email has been deleted by the recipient.41 
In recent years, Web-based email has become increasingly popular.  ISPs like Google, 
MSN and Yahoo! have increased the amount of free storage space that they provide to users of 
 
S.W.2d 910, 912 (Ky. 1986); State v. Stroud, 5 So.2d 125, 127-28 (La. 1941); State v. Benner, 284 A.2d 91, 109 
(Me. 1971); Master v. Master, 166 A.2d 251, 255 (Md. 1960); Martin v. Martin, 166 N.E. 820, 820 (Mass. 1929); 
People v. Rosa, 256 N.W. 483, 485 (Mich. 1934); State v. Schifsky, 69 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Minn. 1955); Stevens v. 
State, 806 So.2d 1031, 1049 (Miss. 2002); State v. Shafer, 609 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Mo. 1980);  State v. Nettleton, 760 
P.2d 733, 737 (Mont. 1988); State v. Cowling, No. A-92-744, 1993 WL 183609,  at *3 (Neb. Ct. App. June 1, 
1993); Foss v. State, 547 P.2d 688, 691 (Nev. 1976); State v. Wilkinson, 612 A.2d 926, 930-31 (N.H. 1992); State v. 
Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 822 (N.J. 1994); State v. Teel, 712 P.2d 792, 794 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); In re Vanderbilt 
(Rosner-Hickey), 439 N.E.2d 378, 382-83 (N.Y. 1982); State v. Freeman, 276 S.E.2d  450, 455 (N.C. 1981); State v. 
McMorrow, 314 N.W.2d 287, 292 (N.D. 1982); State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Ohio 1986); McHam v. 
State, 126 P.3d 662, 671 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); Coles v. Harsch, 276 P.2d 248, 252 (Or. 1929); Commonwealth 
v. May, 656 A.2d 1335, 1342 (Pa. 1995); State v. McKercher, 332 N.W.2d 286, 288 (S.D. 1983); Hazlett v. Bryant, 
241 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tenn. 1951); Zimmerman v. State, 750 S.W.2d 194, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); State v. 
Musser, 175 P.2d 724, 737 (Utah 1946); In re Buckman’s Will, 24 A. 252, 252 (Vt. 1892); Menefee v. 
Commonwealth, 55 S.E.2d 9, 13 (Va. 1949); State v. Thorne, 260 P.2d 331, 336-37 (Wash. 1953); State v. Bohon,
565 S.E.2d 399, 404 (W. Va. 2002); Kain v. State, 179 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Wis. 1970); Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 
272, 275 (Wyo. 1994).  Alaska and South Carolina courts have not addressed the third party presence rule.  But see 
Campbell v. Chase, 1879 WL 3538, at *1 (R.I. April 12, 1879) (excluding from evidence testimony regarding 
communications between a husband and wife made in the presence of other parties and finding that it is not a 
judge’s place to determine the confidentiality of communications between husband and wife, for “the 
communication must be disclosed to the court, and so the mischief intended to be guarded against will be committed 
in the process of ascertaining whether it is entitled to be guarded against.”).  
37 Email downloaded to a user’s home or work computer is outside the purview of this article. 
38 James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure:  Updating Privacy Protections to Keep Pace with Technology, 865 
PLI/Pat 505, 517 (2006).   
39 Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1210 (2004).  See also U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting that 
America On-Line stores its customers’ emails at a privately-owned computer bank in Vienna, Virginia).   
40 Dempsey, supra note 38, at 517.   
41 Id. at 523 (“[S]ince ISPs retain data for varying lengths of time, and do not always delete email immediately upon 
request, customers may not be aware of whether their email is still stored and thus susceptible to disclosure.”). 
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their Web-based email systems.42 As one commentator noted, ISPs will continue to increase 
storage in order to ensure that customers will use the email services more often and to make sure 
customers have no reason to delete old emails.43 
Before addressing whether the marital communications privilege prevents law 
enforcement from accessing emails sent via Web-based accounts, it is important to determine 
whether other protections exist.  Surprisingly, Web-based emails are not protected to the extent 
that one might expect.  
A. Privacy Agreements 
Most ISPs enter into privacy agreements with their users.44 Typically, the privacy 
agreements address the extent to which ISPs collect users’ personal information and provide 
such information to other parties.45 For example, the privacy policies provided by Microsoft, 
Google and Yahoo! all state that the ISPs will not sell personal information to third parties, but 
that the ISPs will provide information in order to comply with the law.46 
Most ISP privacy policies contain no information regarding the deletion of emails from 
the ISP server once the email has been deleted from the user’s account;47 however, Google’s 
Gmail Privacy Policy notifies customers that deleted email will take immediate effect in the 
 
42 Id. at 516-517. 
43 Id. at 517 (citing Janis Mara, “MSN Hotmail Upgrades E-Mail, Increases Storage,” ClickZ News (June 24, 2004), 
www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3372781).   
44 See, e.g., Gmail Privacy Policy, http://gmail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html, (last visited Aug. 6, 2006);  
Microsoft Online Privacy Statement, http://privacy.microsoft.com/en-us/fullnotice.aspx (last visited Aug. 6, 2006); 
Yahoo! Privacy Policy, http://privacy.yahoo.com/privacy/us/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2006). 
45 Id.
46 Google Privacy Policy, http://www.google.com/privacy.html  (last visited Aug. 6, 2006) (“Google only shares 
personal information with other companies or individuals outside of Google . . . [when] we have a good faith belief 
that access, use or preservation or disclosure of such information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any 
applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable government request.”); Microsoft  Online Privacy Statement, 
supra note 44 (“We may access and/or disclose your personal information if we believe such action is necessary to: 
(a) comply with the law or legal process served on Microsoft.”); Yahoo! Privacy Policy, supra note 44 (“We respond 
to subpoenas, court orders, or legal process, or to establish or exercise our legal rights or defend against legal 
claims.”).  See also Dempsey, supra note 38, at 523 (“Virtually every privacy policy . . . allows for disclosure in 
response to a government demand.”). 
47 Id.
13
user’s account view, but “residual copies of deleted messages and accounts may take up to 60 
days to be deleted from our active servers and may remain in our offline backup systems.”48 
Thus, email that has been deleted from a user’s account and that is no longer visible in the user’s 
email account may sit on the ISP’s server indefinitely.   
Clearly, ISP privacy policies do not provide a great deal of protection to users.  The ISPs 
have reserved the right to comply with subpoenas, warrants, court orders or other legal process.  
Thus, as Google notes in the Frequently Asked Questions portion of its Privacy Policy, “the 
primary protections [users] have against intrusions by the government are the laws that apply 
where [they] live.”49 This article will now address those legal protections. 
B. Fourth Amendment Protection 
 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and requires that search warrants be issued only upon a finding of probable 
cause.50 The Supreme Court defines probable cause as “[A] reasonable ground for belief of guilt 
. . . and . . . the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or 
seized.”51 In order for a person to assert protection under the Fourth Amendment, she must 
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated by the government.52 This inquiry 
has two parts:  the person must establish (1) an actual or subjective expectation of privacy, and 
(2) an objective expectation of privacy, or “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”53 
48 Gmail Privacy Policy, supra note 44. 
49 Google Privacy FAQ, http://www.google.com/privacy_faq.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2006).   
50 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
51 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
52 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
53 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  See also Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (citing Justice 
Harlan’s test as the appropriate Fourth Amendment inquiry).   
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Taking into account the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is unclear 
whether the Fourth Amendment provides adequate protection to Web-based email accounts.  In 
U.S. v. Miller, the Court held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily provides to third parties.54 The Court reasoned that the government 
could obtain such information from the third party “even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third 
party will not be betrayed.”55 In the Court’s view, when a person provides personal information 
to third parties, he assumes the risk that the third party will reveal the information to the 
government.56 
Based on the holding of Miller, several lower courts have found that holders of Web-
based email accounts have no legitimate expectation of privacy in subscriber information 
provided to ISPs.57 Subscriber information includes a user’s name, address, birthday and 
password.58 More importantly, lower courts have held that once an email message has been 
delivered to the recipient, the sender has no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.59 
As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has found, once an email reaches its recipient, “the e-
 
54 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).  In Miller, the Court found that a bank depositor has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in financial information voluntarily provided to his banks and the bank’s employees.  Id.
55 Id. at 443. 
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that electronic bulletin board users lack a 
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their subscriber information because they revealed it to a third party); U.S. v. 
Cox, 190 F.Supp.2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); U.S. v. Kennedy, 81 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000); U.S. v. 
Hambrick, 55 F.Supp.2d 504, 507-09 (W.D. Va. 1999). 
58 Guest, 255 F.3d  at 335. 
59 See, e.g., U.S. v. Jones, 149 Fed.Appx. 954, 959 (11th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 
2004) (finding that although individuals possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers, 
“[t]hey do not, however, enjoy such an expectation of privacy in transmissions over the internet or e-mail that have 
already arrived at the recipient.”) ; Guest, 255 F.3d at 333; U.S. v. Charbonneau, 979 F.Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 
1997); U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 418 (finding that once an email is delivered, “the transmitter no longer controls 
its destiny.”); Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. 2001) (no expectation of privacy in emails 
forwarded to the police). 
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mailer would be analogous to a letter-writer, whose expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates 
upon delivery of the letter.”60 
Indeed, due to manner in which ISP searches are conducted, the Fourth Amendment may 
provide no protection at all to Web-based email accounts.  As one commentator notes, 
government investigators do not search the ISPs’ servers directly; rather, they usually provide the 
ISPs with a grand jury subpoena compelling copies of the users’ emails.61 The government may 
issue such a grand jury subpoena even if the emails are protected by the Fourth Amendment.62 
Additionally, unlike a search warrant, a grand jury subpoena may be issued in the absence of 
probable cause.63 So long as the subpoena is reasonable, it will comply with the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment.64 
C. The Stored Communications Act 
Most likely realizing the lack of Fourth Amendment protection afforded electronic 
communications, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in 
 
60 Guest, 255 F.3d at 333 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
61 Kerr, supra note 39, at 1211. 
62 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.2d 341, 347 (4th Cir. 2000) 
63 Id. at 347-48 (“While the Fourth Amendment protects people ‘against unreasonable searches and seizures,’ it 
imposes a probable cause requirement only on the issuance of warrants. . . .  Thus, unless subpoenas are warrants, 
they are limited by the general reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, . . . not the probable cause 
requirement.” (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV)).   
64 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.2d at 347 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1903)).  The Supreme 
Court requires that subpoenas be “sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that 
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.”  See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967).  Courts reason 
that subpoenas and warrants should have different standards because the party upon whom the subpoena is served 
may challenge it before any intrusion occurs.  Searches and seizures, on the other hand, are conducted without prior 
notice.  Thus, probable cause is required in order to ensure compliance with the Constitution.  In re Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, 228 F.2d at 348. 
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1986.65 Several provisions of the ECPA concern stored data such as Web-based email.66 This 
portion of the statute is commonly referred to as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).67 
In enacting the SCA, Congress chose to regulate government access to communications 
provided by two types of communications services.  The first type of service, known as an 
“electronic communication service” (“ECS”), entails a provider sending and receiving 
communications on behalf of the user. 68 The electronic communication service temporarily 
stores the communication pending delivery.  In most cases, the communication is temporarily 
stored on the provider’s server even after delivery.69 The second type of service is known as a 
“remote computing service” (“RCS”).70 When the SCA was enacted in 1986, consumers often 
used such services to store extra files or process large amounts of data.71 Remote computing 
services often retained copies of their customers’ files for long periods of time.72 The main 
difference between an ECS and an RCS is the amount of time the service stores the user’s 
electronic files.  An ECS stores the user’s files temporarily while an RCS stores the user’s files 
long-term. 
The type of protection afforded to an electronic communication turns on whether the ISP 
is an ECS or an RCS as well as the amount of time the communication has been stored with the 
 
65 Public Law No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.).  See also Kerr, supra note 39, at 
1212 (“The [ECPA] creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections by statute, regulating the 
relationship between government investigators and service providers in possession of users’ private information.”).   
66 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711.  The title of the statute applicable to stored data is known as the Stored Wire and 
Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access.  Id.
67 See Dempsey, supra note 38, at 521; Kerr, supra note 39, at 1208. 
68 The statute defines an electronic communications service as “any service which provides to users thereof the 
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 
69 See Kerr, supra note 39, at 1213. 
70 The statute defines a remote computing service as “the provision to the public of computer storage or processing 
services by means of an electronic communications system.” 18 U.S.C.§ 2711(2). 
71 See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at *3, reprinted at 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557. 
72 Id.
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provider.73 Under the SCA, the government may access a communication stored by an ECS for 
180 days or less only pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of probable cause.74 If the 
communication is stored with the ECS for more than 180 days, the government may access it 
with a subpoena75 or a court order76 and prior notice to the subscriber.77 The standards for 
government access to communications stored with an RCS are identical to those required for 
government access to a communication stored for more than 180 days with an ECS.78 
In sum, electronic communications like Web-based emails are afforded no more 
protection under the SCA than the Fourth Amendment unless they have been stored for 180 days 
or less, assuming that ISPs who provide Web-based emails are even considered providers of 
ECS.  One commentator has argued that providers of Web-based email are multifunctional and 
that they can serve as ECS and RCS for a particular communication at any given time.79 For 
example, a provider who holds an email in intermediate storage until its recipient views it would 
be considered an ECS.80 As stated earlier, to access such an email, the government would need a 
search warrant.  This protection is identical to the Fourth Amendment protection provided to 
 
73 The SCA defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication 
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).  Thus, a 
customer’s use of Web-based email would be considered “electronic storage” under the SCA even if the customer 
deletes the email immediately after reading it.  It follows that electronic storage would also include an ISP’s 
retention of an email in a customer’s inbox after the customer has read it but not deleted it.  Indeed, if the ISP stores 
a copy of the email for backup purposes even after the customer has deleted it from her inbox, the retention of the 
email would still be considered electronic storage. 
74 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
75 The reasonableness standard for the issuance of subpoenas is discussed at Section II.B, supra.
76 In order for a court order to be issued under the SCA, the government must show “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the 
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  18 U.S.C. § 
2703(d). 
77 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b).  The government may delay notice to the subscriber by up to 90 days upon providing 
proof that there is reason to believe that notification might have an adverse result, including the destruction of 
evidence, flight from prosecution or intimidation of potential witnesses.  Id. § 2705(a).   
78 Id. 2703(b). 
79 Kerr, supra note 39, at 1215-16. 
80 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  Accord In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 
511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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emails that have not yet been delivered.81 However, if the recipient leaves the email in her inbox 
(and on the ISP’s server) after reviewing it, the ISP may be serving as an RCS.82 If this 
characterization is correct, then the government would be allowed to access opened emails with a 
subpoena or a court order, and neither of these authorizations requires probable cause.83 Under 
this scenario, the SCA provides no more protection to opened emails than the Fourth 
Amendment provides.84 
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the SCA provides a great level of protection for Web-
based emails.  The marital communications privilege is the only barrier preventing law 
enforcement access to confidential spousal communications sent via email.  However, as Section 
III of this article will demonstrate, the very nature of Web-based email likely prevents the 
privilege from attaching at all.   
III. Analysis of the Marital Communications Privilege as Applied to Web-Based Email 
 Case law concerning applicability of the marital communications privilege and the third 
party presence rule is plentiful.  Although courts have not yet addressed whether the privilege 
applies to Web-based email, a number of analogies will demonstrate that the marital 
communications privilege is inapplicable to Web-based email under current law.    
 A. Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to Letters 
 It is quite logical to compare an email to a letter.  Both are written forms of 
communication where a writer drafts a message and sends it to its recipient.  Thus, if the marital 
 
81 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
82 See Kerr, supra note 39, at 1216 (“The traditional understanding has been that a copy of opened email sitting on a 
server is protected by the RCS rules, not the ECS rules  The thinking is that when an email customer leaves a copy 
of an already-accessed email stored on a server, that copy is no longer ‘incident to transmission’ nor a backup copy 
of the file that is incident to transmission; rather, it is just in remote storage like any other file held by an RCS.”).  
But see Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that emails stored on an ISP’s server 
following delivery are usually stored for backup protection, thereby making the more stringent ECS rules 
applicable). 
83 See supra notes 75 through 77 and accompanying text. 
84 See supra Section II.B. 
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communications privilege applies to letters discovered by third parties, then it follows that the 
privilege should apply to Web-based emails accessed by ISPs in response to a court order, 
subpoena or search warrant.  Unfortunately, the case law almost universally states that where the 
contents of a letter between spouses are discovered by a third party, the marital communications 
privilege does not apply. 
 For example, in the case State of Kansas v. Myers,85 defendant Myers was convicted of 
voluntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery and arson.86 On appeal, Myers argued that the trial 
court erred in admitting into evidence letters he had written to his wife.  The letters contained 
very damaging admissions of Myers’ role in the alleged crimes.87 The state offered the letters 
into evidence, not through Myers’ wife, but through Cassity, a friend of Myers.88 Myers’ wife 
had lived in Cassity’s basement for a period of time.  Three months after she moved out, Cassity 
found the letters under a mattress and turned them over to law enforcement officers.89 
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in allowing the letters into 
evidence.90 The court reasoned that the letters had fallen into Cassity’s hands inadvertently and 
without the connivance of Myers’ wife.91 Therefore, the purpose of the marital privilege, to 
protect the confidential relationship between spouses, would not be thwarted if a third person 
acquires the communication and discloses it.92 The court also found that construing the marital 
communications privilege narrowly would ensure that relevant facts are available to the court 
unless very specific exceptions apply.93 
85 640 P.2d 1245 (Kan. 1982). 




90 640 P.2d at 1248. 
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1248-49. 
93 Id.
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The result in Myers is not unusual.  In State v. Szemple,94 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
considered a similar factual situation.  Defendant Szemple, charged with first-degree murder, 
wrote a letter to his wife while he awaited trial.95 The letter contained a description of a murder 
he had committed.  Defendant’s wife had the letter in her possession when she and her father 
moved her belongings from one residence to another.96 During the move, the wife’s father 
discovered the letter and stuck it in his shirt.  After reviewing the letter, he turned it over to the 
prosecutor on the case.97 The trial court allowed the letter into evidence despite Szemple’s 
objection on the basis of the marital communications privilege.98 
In finding that the letter was not protected by the marital communications privilege, the 
Szemple court noted that the privilege should be construed narrowly “as its only effect [is] the 
suppression of relevant evidence . . . .”99 This approach to the evidentiary privileges, according 
to the court, justifies the third party presence rule.100 The court reasoned that the privilege does 
not attach to the communication but to the spouses.101 Accordingly, no privilege is violated if 
the letter ends up in the hands of a third party outside the marriage.102 Finally, the court noted 
that Szemple and his wife should have been more cautious.  The court stated that Szemple knew 
or should have known that the letter might fall into the hands of a third party because letters, 
unlike oral conversations, have a “long life”.103 
94 640 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1994). 
95 Id. at 819. 
96 Id.
97 Id. at 819-20. 
98 Id. at 820. 
99 640 A.2d at 821. 
100 Id.
101 Id. at 822. 
102 Id.
103 Id. at 824.  According to the Szemple court, “To obtain the benefit of the privilege, spouses must take the 
precautions necessary to ensure that inter-spousal communications be kept confidential.  When they fail to do so, the 
privilege is lost.”  Id.
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The outcomes of Myers and Szemple are consistent with many cases involving 
inadvertent disclosure of a spousal communication to a third party.  For example, in Ellis v. 
State, an Alabama Court of Appeals held that the privilege did not apply to defendant’s suicide 
note to her husband where it was found on the floor by police officers answering a 911 call.104 
The court reasoned that the privilege cannot “protect against the testimony of third parties who 
have secured possession or learned the contents” of the communication.105 In Metcalf v. State,
where the defendant wrote a letter to his wife from jail, placed it in an unsealed envelope, and 
requested that a soon-to-be-released inmate deliver it, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the 
privilege did not apply because the defendant waived any potential confidentiality by handing 
over the unsealed letter to another inmate.106 In Commonwealth v. May, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that a letter sent from a prison inmate to his wife was not privileged, 
especially considering that the inmate had signed a form permitting prison guards to review all 
incoming and outgoing mail.107 The facts of May are particularly analogous to one’s use of 
Web-based email.  The May court found the defendant’s agreement with the prison to be 
determinative on the issue of whether he had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.108 
Similar to the defendant in May, a user of Web-based email signs an agreement granting the ISP 
the right to review incoming and outgoing messages.109 Thus, it follows that a court would find 
that a user of Web-based email has no viable claim of confidentiality in messages sent via the 
Internet.  Finally, the facts of Wolfe v. U.S.110 are applicable here.  As stated earlier, Wolfe
104 570 So.2d 744, 759 (1990).   
105 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
106 681 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1984). 
107 656 A.2d 1335, 1342 (1995). 
108 Id.
109 See supra Section II.A. 
110 291 U.S. 7 (1934). 
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involved a defendant who wrote a letter to his wife via his personal stenographer.111 The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the defendant’s decision to involve his stenographer in the 
communication prevented the privilege from attaching.112 
Most of the scenarios mentioned above involve the inadvertent and sometimes careless 
disclosure of confidential communications to a third party by one or both of the spouses.  
Additionally, some of the scenarios involve the intentional disclosure to the third party on the 
part of the communicating spouse.113 A comparison of letters to Web-based emails makes sense 
regardless of whether the disclosure to the third party is inadvertent or intentional.  It is clear that 
even if a third party intentionally seeks to discover the content of the communication, no 
violation of the privilege will occur.  If the writer of a Web-based email fails to protect it by 
intentionally or inadvertently disclosing it to the ISP, then the case law regarding applicability of 
the privilege to letters indicates that the privilege would never apply to Web-based email 
considering that disclosure of the communication is necessary for a writer to successfully send an 
email message.   
B. Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to Oral Communications 
The case law regarding application of the marital communications privilege to oral 
communications typically involves either live conversations overheard by a third party or 
recorded messages discovered by a third party.  Web-based email is probably more analogous to 
recorded messages, considering that both forms of communication can be preserved and fall into 
the hands of a third party.  However, the distinction between live and recorded conversations 
 
111 Id. at 13. 
112 Id. at 17. 
113 Recall that intentional disclosure on the part of the recipient-spouse typically will not destroy the privilege.  See
supra notes 22 through 23 and accompanying text. 
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makes no difference.  Both forms of communication, if overheard or discovered by a third party, 
are outside the protection of the marital communications privilege. 
In Proffitt v. State,114 The Florida Supreme Court considered the following facts:  
Defendant Proffitt was convicted of murder in the first degree.115 At trial, the prosecution 
offered into evidence an oral conversation between Proffitt and his wife wherein Proffitt 
confessed that he had killed a man.116 The state offered evidence of the conversation through the 
testimony of Mrs. Bassett, a woman who was renting a room next to Proffitt’s room in a two-
bedroom mobile home.117 Although Bassett was not in Proffitt’s room during the conversation, 
she was able to hear certain segments of the conversation.118 
In holding that the conversation was not privileged, the court found that the Proffitts 
knew or should have known that there was a possibility that their conversation was being 
overheard.119 The court noted that the Proffitts must have realized that Ms. Bassett was in the 
next room because she made rental payments to them each month.120 Additionally, the court 
found that the Proffitts did not attempt to keep their voices low because Ms. Bassett heard their 
conversation despite her door being closed.121 These facts, in the court’s opinion, demonstrated 
that the Proffitts failed to take steps to protect the confidentiality of their conversation.122 
114 315 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1975), aff’d 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 




119 315 So.2d at 465. 
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. Accord Nash v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 146 S.E. 726, 727 (W. Va. 1929) (conversation between 
spouses overheard by boarder not privileged).  See also State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686, 695 (Ariz. 1984) (holding 
that conversations between defendant and his wife while police officers were present were not privileged 
communications). 
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A conversation overheard by a third party will remain unprivileged even if the third party 
intentionally eavesdrops on the conversation.  Consider Horn v. State,123 where defendant Horn 
was convicted of second degree murder.124 At trial, the state offered the testimony of Joyce 
Walker, who worked as a nurse alongside Horn’s wife.  Walker testified regarding a telephone 
conversation between Horn and his wife while his wife was at work.125 According to Walker, 
Mrs. Horn was alerted that she had a telephone call while she was conversing with Walker.  
When Mrs. Horn picked up the telephone, Walker lifted another telephone receiver without Mrs. 
Horn’s knowledge and listened to the conversation.126 Walker testified that she eavesdropped on 
the conversation because she was “being nosey”.127 
On appeal, Horn asserted that the trial court erred in admitting Walker’s testimony 
because the conversation was protected by the marital communications privilege.128 The Florida 
Court of Appeals found that conversations overheard by a third party are not privileged, 
regardless of whether the third party acts “surreptitiously or openly”.129 Thus, the conversation 
between Horn and his wife was not protected by the privilege.130 This approach to 
eavesdropping by third parties is consistent with a very narrow application of the privilege.131 
Likewise, case law indicates that recorded conversations are not privileged where a third 
party gains access to the recording.  In Wong-Wing v. State,132 the defendant was charged with 
 
123298 So.2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
124 Id. at 195. 
125 Id.
126 Id. at 195-96. 
127 Id.
128 298 So.2d at 196. 
129 Id. at 196 (quoting 63 A.L.R. 107, 108-09). 
130 Id. Ultimately, the court held that Walker’s testimony regarding the conversation was inadmissible because she 
violated Florida’s wiretap statute by eavesdropping on the conversation.  Id. at 198. 
131 See State v. Thorne, 260 P.2d 331, 336 (Wash. 1953) (“If the communication is heard by a third party, even if by 
eavesdropping, the third party may testify to it, since the privilege protects only successful confidences.”). 
132 847 A.2d 1206 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
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several counts of child sexual abuse.133 The state offered into evidence the transcript and 
recording of a message the defendant had left his wife on her answering machine.134 The 
defendant objected on the basis of the spousal privilege.135 The Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals found that the message was not privileged because the defendant left the message on an 
answering machine in a home that his wife shared with her daughter and mother.136 According 
to the court, “when appellant left the message on the answering machine, he ran the risk that 
someone other than [defendant’s wife] would retrieve the message.”137 
The analogy between oral conversations and Web-based email is fairly sound.  Similar to 
the live conversation in Proffitt and the recorded message in Wong-Wing, a person who chooses 
to draft a Web-based email has failed to take precautions to prevent a third party from accessing 
the message.  The writer deposits the email communication with the ISP, thereby running the 
risk that the ISP could access the message and turn it over to the government.  As demonstrated 
in Horn, even if the ISP intentionally seeks to learn the content of the message, the privilege 
would not apply to Web-based emails based on the application of the privilege to oral 
conversations. 
C. The Effect of Email on Applicability of the Professional Privileges 
 It is helpful to draw an analogy between the marital communications privilege and the 
other evidentiary privileges, hereinafter referred to as the “professional privileges”.  These 
privileges include the privileges between attorney and client, physician and patient, 
psychotherapist and patient, and clergy and communicant.  Case law regarding the latter three 
privileges and the effect that communication via email might have on their applicability is 
 
133 Id. at 1208. 
134 Id. at 1210. 
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1213. 
137 847 A.2d at 1213. 
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virtually non-existent.  However, much commentary and a few court opinions have addressed 
whether the use of email vitiates the attorney-client privilege.  Before discussing whether it is 
appropriate to draw an analogy between the marital communications privilege and the 
professional privileges, this article will explore what effect the use of email has on the 
application of the attorney-client privilege. 
1. Email and the Attorney-Client Privilege 
 The attorney-client privilege, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, is “the oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.”138 The purpose of the 
privilege is to promote open and full communication between attorney and client, “thereby 
promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of 
justice.”139 Some nuances of the attorney-client privilege vary depending on jurisdiction, but the 
general legal principles of the privilege state that it arises: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, 
(2) From a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, 
(3) The communications relating to that purpose, 
(4) Made in confidence, 
(5) By the client, 
(6) Are at his instant permanently protected, 
(7) From disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) Except the protection be waived.140 
138 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 Wigmore EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 
1961)). 
139 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1988). 
140Wigmore, supra note 22, § 2292. 
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Under federal law, “[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client.”141 
Several legal commentators and some court opinions have addressed whether the use of 
email, by its nature, will result in waiver of the attorney client privilege.  In In re Asia Global 
Crossing, Ltd..,142 the court addressed whether the officers of a bankrupt corporation waived any 
privilege they may have had in communications between themselves and their personal attorneys 
when they communicated with the attorneys via the corporate email system.143 Apparently, the 
emails concerned potential disputes between the officers and the debtor-corporation.144 The 
debtor-corporation’s bankruptcy Trustee claimed that the communications, which were stored on 
the debtor-corporation’s email servers, were not privileged simply due to the fact that they were 
sent by way of email, which carries an inherent risk of unauthorized disclosure.145 The court 
found that, although email carries some risk of unauthorized disclosure, the prevailing view is 
that communication through email offers a reasonable expectation of privacy.146 Therefore, 
according to the court, a client’s decision to communicate with her attorney via email does not, 
without more, constitute waiver of the privilege.147 
141 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503.  Although Rule 503 was never enacted, many courts cite this Rule with authority.  
See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2005) (“While Congress did not adopt any of the 
proposed rules concerning various privileges, courts have observed that Proposed Rule 503 is a useful starting place 
for an examination of the federal common law of attorney-client privilege” because the rule “restates, rather than 
modifies, the common law lawyer-client privilege.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
142 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
143 Id. at 253. 
144 Id. at 256. 
145 Id. at 252, 256 
146 Id. at 256. 
147 322 B.R. at 256. 
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The Supreme Court of Nevada made an identical ruling in City of Reno v. Reno Police 
Protective Association.148 In City of Reno, a union organization sued the City of Reno, claiming 
unfair labor practices.149 The state labor relations board admitted into evidence a document 
authored by the City’s labor relations manager and sent, as an email attachment, to the City’s 
attorney.150 The City claimed that the attorney-client privilege applied to the document, but the 
union organization argued that documents sent by email cannot be protected by the attorney-
client privilege.151 The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed, finding that “a document transmitted 
by email is protected by the attorney-client privilege as long as the requirements of the privilege 
are met.”152 
In making their rulings, the courts in In re: Asian Global Crossing and City of Reno
relied on American Bar Association (“ABA”) and state bar association opinions finding that 
communication by way of unencrypted email does not violate a lawyer’s ethical obligation to 
maintain client confidentiality.153 Both opinions cited ABA Formal Opinion 99-413, issued in 
March 1999.154 Although the ABA opinion deals with client confidentiality under the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct,155 some legal commentators and court opinions have cited the 
ABA Opinion as persuasive authority on the issue of whether the mere use of unencrypted email 
 
148 59 P.3d 1212 (Nev. 2003). 
149 Id. at 1214. 
150 Id. at 1215. 
151 Id. at 1218. 
152 59 P.3d at 1218. 
153 See In re: Asian Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 256 (citing ABCNY Formal Op. 2000-1, 2000 WL 704689 (Jan. 
2000); ABA Formal Ethics Op. 99-413 (March 10, 1999); NYSBA Eth. Op. 709, 1998 WL 957924 (Sept. 16, 
1998)).  See also City of Reno, 59 P.3d at 1218 (citing ABA Formal Ethics Op. 99-413).  Encryption is defined as “a 
method of electronically or digitally coding a message sent online, whereby only the intended recipient can unlock 
the code and read the message.”  Audrey Jordan, Student Note, Does Unencrypted E-Mail Protect Client 
Confidentiality?, 27 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 623, 624 (2004). 
154 See supra note 153. 
155 Model Rule 1.6 states, “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the 
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”  MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6. 
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vitiates the attorney-client privilege.156 While acknowledging that email communications have 
some inherent security problems, the ABA Opinion found that email “poses no greater risk of 
interception or disclosure than other modes of communication commonly relied upon as having a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”157 The ABA’s blanket statement that all email transmissions 
afford a reasonable expectation of privacy is nothing less than a gross generalization. 158 
However, the ABA and state bar associations159 have likely found a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to exist so that attorneys will not be forced to purchase expensive encryption software or 
completely discontinue the use of email to communicate with clients.160 
Despite some problems with reasoning behind the ABA Opinion, it is clear that state bar 
associations and some courts have relied upon the ABA Opinion in finding that the use of 
 
156 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  See also Dion Messer, To: Client@Workplace.com: Privilege at 
Risk?, 23 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 75, 75 n.2 (2004).  The Maryland Court of Appeals explored the 
relationship between Rule 1.6 and the attorney client privilege in Newman v. State, 863 A.2d 321 (Md. 2004).  The 
court noted that “[t]he principle of confidentiality is given effect in both bodies of law.  The attorney-client privilege 
applies in judicial and other proceedings in which an attorney may be called as a witness or otherwise required to 
produce evidence adverse to his client” while Rule 1.6 “applies in all other situations that do not involve the 
compulsion of law.”  Id. at 332.  Indeed, the court noted that Rule 1.6 has a broader application than the attorney-
client privilege because the rule “is not limited to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also applies 
to all information related to the representation, whether obtained from the client or through the attorney’s 
independent investigation . . . .”  Id.
157 ABA Opinion, supra note 153. 
158 See supra Section II.B.  The ABA also stated in its opinion that the ECPA provides adequate protection for 
emails accessed by third parties; however, as this article demonstrates, the ECPA does not provide a great deal of 
protection to emails stored on ISP servers.  See supra Section II.C. 
159 Several state bar associations have opined that the use of unencrypted email does not violate an attorney’s ethical 
duty to protect client confidences.  See Alaska Eth. Op. 98-2 (1998); Ariz. Eth. Op. 97-04 (1997); Ariz. Eth. Op. 02-
04 (2002); Colo. Eth. Op. 90 (1992); Conn. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 99- 52 (1999); Del. Eth. Op. 2001-2 (2001); 
D.C. Eth. Op. 281 (1998); Haw. Discp. Counsel, Informal Op. 40 (2001); Ill. Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997); 
Iowa Comm. of Prof. Ethics & Conduct, Op. 97-01 (1997); Iowa Comm. of Prof. Ethics & Conduct, Op. 96-33 
(1997); Ky. Eth. Op. E-403 (1998); Ky. Formal & Informal Op., Isba Op. No. 96-10 (1997); Md. Eth. Op. 92-19 
(1992); Mass. Eth. Op. 00-1 (2000); Minn. Eth. Op. 19 (1999); Mo. Eth., Informal Op. 990007; N.Y. Comm. Prof. 
& Judicial Eth., Formal Op. 1998-2 (1998); N.C. Eth. Op. RPC 215 (1995); N.D. Eth. Op. 97-09 (1997); Ohio Eth. 
Op. 99-2 (1999); Pa. Eth. Op. 97- 130 (1997); S.C. Eth. Op. 97-08 (1997); Tenn. Prof. Respon. Bd., Advisory Op. 
98-A-650(a) (1998); Utah Eth. Op. 00-01 (2000); Vt. Eth. Op. 97-5 (1997). 
160 See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Should Lawyers Use E-Mail to Communicate with Clients?, 92 Ill. B. J. 572, 576 
(2004) (stating that some in the legal community feel “[i]t doesn’t make sense . . . to impose restrictions on the use 
of email so onerous that they would destroy its utility.”).  Clearly, an encryption requirement would hurt the legal 
profession, due to the cost of such software and the prevalence of email usage in the legal profession.  See Messer, 
supra note 156, at 75 (citing a 2003 technology survey that revealed that 80 percent of attorneys use email one or 
more times a day and that 96 percent of those lawyers use email for correspondence with clients and colleagues). 
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unencrypted email does not prevent the attorney-client privilege from attaching.  Thus, assuming 
that the analogy between the marital communications privilege and the attorney-client privilege 
is proper, then the use of Web-based email would not endanger the privilege.  Next, this article 
will explore whether the marital communications privilege should be analogized to the attorney-
client privilege or any of the other evidentiary privileges. 
2. A Comparison of the Marital Communications Privilege to the Other Evidentiary 
Privileges 
The attorney-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient and clergy-communicant 
privileges possess some similarities and some differences when compared to the marital 
communications privilege.  The general principles of the attorney-client privilege have already 
been discussed.161 The physician-patient privilege protects from disclosure confidential 
communications made by a patient to his physician for the purpose of medical treatment.162 The 
purpose of the privilege “is to encourage patients’ full disclosure of information which will 
enable medical providers to extend the best medical care possible.”163 
It must be noted that the federal courts do not recognize a physician-patient privilege.164 
Indeed, in its proposed codification of the evidentiary privileges in 1973, the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence conspicuously left out any rule of privilege 
protecting the physician-patient relationship.165 The Committee reasoned that a general 
physician-patient privilege was unnecessary so long as a psychotherapist-patient privilege was 
 
161 See supra Section III.C.1. 
162 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1) (d); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-1-14-5; Minn. Stat. § 595.92; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 
4504(a). 
163 State v. Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
164 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (“The physician-patient evidentiary privilege is unknown to 
the common law. In states where it exists by legislative enactment, it is subject to many exceptions and to waiver for 
many reasons.”); Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503, 506-07 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Unfortunately for [plaintiff], 
federal common law does not recognize a physician-patient privilege.”). 
165 See Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 504. 
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codified.166 The U.S. Supreme Court apparently agrees with this position.  While it has found 
that the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is necessary for proper diagnosis and 
treatment,167 the Court has stated that “treatment by a physician for physical ailments can often 
proceed successfully on the basis of a physical examination, objective information supplied by 
the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests.”168 
The psychotherapist-patient privilege, recognized by the federal courts and many state courts, 
protects from disclosure confidential communications between a patient and her psychologist, 
social worker or licensed counselor where such communications assist the professional in 
making a complete diagnosis.169 The purpose of the privilege, according to the California 
legislature, is as follows:   
“Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are dependent upon the fullest 
revelation of the most intimate and embarrassing details of the 
patient’s life. . . .  Unless a patient . . . is assured that such 
information can and will be held in utmost confidence, he will be 
reluctant to make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis and 
treatment . . . depends.”170 
Finally, the clergy-communicant171 privilege protects communications made to a member 
of the clergy during the course of spiritual counseling or advice.172 Similar to the purposes of the 
 
166 Id.
167 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996). 
168 Id. at 10. 
169 See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1012; Iowa Code Ann. § 622.10; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 32 §§ 7005, 13862; Minn. Stat. § 
595.02; Wash. Rev. Code § 18.83.110.   
170 California Sen. Judiciary Com., 29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) § 1014 at 333 (quoted in San Diego 
Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 476, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)). 
171 The terminology “clergy-communicant” is used in lieu of “priest-penitent” in order to acknowledge that the 
privilege applies not only to Roman Catholic priests and their penitents, but to communications between clergy and 
communicants of other denominations.  In re: Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 1990).   
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other professional privileges, the purpose of the clergy-communicant privilege is to encourage 
the exercise of religious duty and assist the clergy member in performing his or her counseling 
duties.173 
At first glance, each of the professional privileges appears to be quite similar to the 
marital communications privilege.  After all, each privilege seeks to protect confidential 
information.  A closer look at the purposes and application of the privileges reveals that the 
marital communications privilege is different from the others, and these differences contradict 
the argument that courts should treat all of the evidentiary privileges in the same manner. 
 The marital communications privilege is different from the professional privileges in 
several ways.  The origins of the marital communications privilege are unique.  Unlike the 
professional privileges, which originally existed to encourage confidential communications 
between certain parties,174 the marital privilege’s original purpose was to ensure that spouses 
would not have to face the humiliation and embarrassment of testifying against each other.175 
The confidential communications aspect of the privilege was not officially recognized until 
1934, many years after Supreme Court recognized the testimonial aspect of the privilege.176 At 
least one commentator has noted that, due to the different origins of the marital privilege, case 
law regarding the marital communications privilege is unhelpful in predicting how a court would 
rule on the other privileges.177 
This difference in origin between the marital communications privilege and the 
professional privileges could also explain the difference in application of the third party presence 
 
172Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.505; 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-803; Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060(3).  See also In re Grand 
Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 384 (finding that the privilege exists at federal common law). 
173 State v. Potter, 478 S.E.2d 742, 755 (W.Va. 1996). 
174 See supra Section III.C.2. 
175 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
177 Hundley, supra note 4, at 265, n.9.  
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rule.  As demonstrated earlier, the third party presence rule prevents the marital communications 
privilege from attaching where a third party is present during an otherwise confidential 
communication between spouses.178 Courts have applied the third party presence rule in the 
context of the professional privileges, but the application has been less severe.  With regard to 
the attorney-client privilege, for example, courts recognize that the presence of a third party 
during communications between an attorney and her client will generally waive the privilege.179 
However, if the third party is an agent of the attorney or someone retained to aid in the 
preparation of the client’s case, then the privilege will apply.180 In fact, some courts have held 
that even where the third parties are not present at the request of the attorney, their presence may 
not vitiate the privilege if the client “reasonably understood the conference to be confidential 
notwithstanding the presence of third parties.”181 For example, in Rosati v. Kuzman,182 the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the presence of a child defendant’s parents during 
conversations with his attorney did not prevent application of the attorney-client privilege to 
those conversations.183 Noting the parents’ “vital” role as the child’s confidants, the court found 
that the child reasonably and unequivocally intended that the conversations remain 
 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 14 through 22.  
179 See, e.g., Clagett v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 263, 270 (Va. 1996) (finding unprivileged a conversation 
between attorney and defendant in the hallway outside a courtroom where the state’s forensic expect overheard the 
conversation and reported its details to the prosecutor). 
180 See, e.g., PSE Consulting v. Frank Mercede and Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 167 n.28 (Conn. 2004) (“We have 
recognized, however, that the presence of certain third parties who are agents or employees of an attorney or client, 
and who are necessary to the consultation, will not destroy the confidential nature of the communications.”) (internal 
quotations omitted); State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66, 77 (Haw. 1997) (holding that the key to determining whether the 
presence of a third party waives the privilege will turn on whether client and attorney “knew of should have known 
that there was no reasonable expectation of confidentiality” due to the presence of the third party); People v. Osorio,
549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185-86 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the presence of a third party typically waives the privilege, but 
recognizing that “[a]n exception exists for statements made by a client to the attorney’s employees or in their 
presence because clients have a reasonable expectation that such statements will be used solely for their benefit and 
remain confidential.”); Floyd v. Floyd, 615 S.E.2d 465, 483 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“The privilege may extend to 
agents of the attorney.”). 
181 Newman, 863 A.2d at 333 (internal quotations omitted). 
182 660 A.2d 263 (R.I. 1995). 
183 Id. at 267. 
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confidential.184 Indeed, even where the third party is neither an agent of the attorney nor a 
confidant of the client, it has been held that a third party’s presence will not destroy the attorney-
client privilege where the third party is serving as a translator or interpreter in order to facilitate 
the communication between attorney and client.185 
Likewise, the physician-patient privilege generally will not attach where a third party is 
present.186 However, the privilege does apply where the third party is present to “aid physicians 
or transmit information to physicians on behalf of patients.”187 Additionally, where the third 
party’s presence is required by law, courts have held that any communications between 
physicians and patients overheard by the third party will remain privileged.188 For example, 
where a police officer escorted defendant to the hospital following a car accident, it was held that 
communications between the defendant and his nurse while in the presence of the officer were 
privileged.189 
In the context of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the presence of a third party 
generally will prevent application of the privilege.190 However, where two patients are 
participating in a joint counseling session, the privilege will attach.191 Additionally, the third 
party presence rule works almost identically to the third party presence rule in the context of the 
 
184 Id.
185 See People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d at 1185-86. 
186 People v. Covington, 19 P.3d 15, 20 (Colo. 2001) 
187 Darnell v. State, 674 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).  Accord State v. Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2006) (stating that a third party’s presence vitiates the physician-patient privilege unless the third party is 
“a necessary and customary participant in the consultation or treatment.”). 
188 See, e.g., People v. Jaffarian, 799 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2005). 
189 Id.
190 See Redding v. Virginia Mason Medical Center, 878 P.2d 483, 485 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).  Accord State v. 
Branch-Wear, 695 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Me. 1997). 
191 Id. at 486.  Accord City of Cedar Falls v. Cedar Falls Community School District, 617 N.W.2d 11, 22 (Iowa 
2000). 
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physician-patient privilege.  Each of the privileges will attach where the third party is a necessary 
and customary participant in the consultation or treatment of the patient.192 
Even in the context of the clergy-communicant privilege, which traditionally applied to a 
penitent’s private confessions to his priest,193 the modern view of the privilege holds that a third 
party’s presence will not destroy the privilege where the third party is “essential to and in 
furtherance of” a communication between clergy and communicant.194 For example, where a 
member of the clergy had a group discussion with five unrelated persons, the privilege would 
still apply if all parties present were essential to the facilitation of the communication.195 In 
determining whether a third party is essential to and furtherance of the communication, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that courts must inquire into the nature of the communicant’s 
relationship to the third party as well as the pastoral counseling practices of the clergy members 
in the relevant religious denomination.196 
Only in the context of the marital communications privilege do courts apply the third 
party presence rule virtually without exception.197 Several explanations exist for the difference 
in treatment.  First, because the marital privilege originated from society’s distaste for requiring 
 
192 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.  See also State v. Gullekson, 383 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (stating that the psychotherapist-patient privilege will attach where the third party is necessary). 
193 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 386 (3d. Cir. 1990) 
194 Id. Accord People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 321 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A]n admission or confession is 
not privileged if made to a clergy member in the presence of a third person unless such person is indispensable to the 
counseling or consoling activity of the clergy member.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
195 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 386. 
196 Id. at 387.  The Third Circuit noted that delving into the pastoral counseling practices of a particular 
denomination poses no First Amendment problem.  Rather, “we believe that establishing the pastoral practices of a 
particular denomination to ascertain the types of communications that the denomination deems spiritual and 
confidential is both a necessary and a constitutionally inoffensive threshold step in determining whether a privilege 
interdenominational in nature applies in light of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”  Id. at 378 n.21.  
197 See supra Sections III.A and III.B.  Note that third party presence will not destroy the marital communications 
privilege where the third party is incapable of understanding the communication.  See State v Bohon, 565 S.E.2d 
399, 403-04 (W. Va. 2002) (holding that the presence of a married couple’s eight-month old child during 
confidential spousal communications did not vitiate the privilege).  But see State v. Muenick, 498 N.E.2d 171, 173 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (finding the marital communications privilege inapplicable to statements made in the presence 
and hearing of the couple’s ten and eleven year-old sons). 
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one spouse to betray the other,198 society may be less concerned if a third party is able disclose 
the communication without the assistance or connivance of the recipient-spouse.199 
Additionally, courts may apply the third party presence rule more strictly in the context 
of the marital communications privilege because the marital privilege is more limited than the 
professional privileges.  In Glover v. State,200 the Indiana Supreme Court found that the marital 
communications privilege does not apply as broadly as the professional privileges, in part 
because the privilege’s primary purpose is not to promote disclosure between the parties.201 The 
court noted that the existence of the professional privileges facilitates open communication 
between the professionals and their clients.202 The marital communications privilege, on the 
other hand, exists to ensure the health of marriages and prevent marital conflict.203 The court 
found that “[a] desire to promote disclosure between spouses may be a secondary consideration 
in support of the marital privilege, but that factor is less critical than the need of an attorney to 
counsel or a doctor to treat based on complete and accurate information.”204 Thus, if it is true 
that marital harmony rather than the promotion of confidential disclosure is the primary purpose 
of the martial communications privilege, it follows that the disclosure of spousal 
communications by third parties should not implicate the privilege.   
 
198 See supra notes 8 and 12.  See also Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, EVIDENCE § 5.31, at 397 (3d. 
ed. 2003) (“It is repellant to force husband or wife to breach the trust of marriage by becoming the instrument of the 
other’s criminal conviction.”). 
199 See Hundley, supra note 4, at 265, n.9 (stating that courts likely enforce the third party rule based on the 
assumption that a husband would not physically abuse his wife for disclosing confidential communications if a third 
party other than the wife testifies regarding the communication). 
200 836 N.E.2d 414 (Ind. 2005). 
201 Id. at 421-22. 
202 Id. at 421. 
203 Id.
204 Id. But see Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 909 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1995).  In Ulibarri, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
noted that professional communications have as an additional source of protection – namely, the ethical and 
disciplinary rules of each profession.  Id. at 454.  The court held that “[b]ecause there is no corresponding set of 
ethical and disciplinary rules for the marital relationship, judicial enforcement of the marital communications 
privilege is all that protects a spouse from being compelled to testify about marital communications.”).  Id. If this 
reasoning is correct, it could be argued that the marital communications privilege, the most vulnerable of all 
privileges, should be applied more broadly than the professional privileges. 
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The most likely reason for the difference in application of the third party presence rule in 
the context of the marital communications privilege centers on the idea of necessity.  With regard 
to the professional privileges, the theme of necessity is present in the court decisions allowing 
the privileges to apply despite the presence of third parties.  Where the third party is present to 
assist the professional,205 comfort the layperson,206 comply with the requirements of the law,207 
or further the communication itself,208 each of the professional privileges will attach because the 
third party’s presence is necessary.  As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Wolfe, “where it is the 
policy of the law to throw its protection around knowledge gained or statements made in 
confidence, it will find a way to make that protection effective by bringing within its scope the 
testimony of those whose participation in the confidence is reasonably required.”209 In the 
context of the marital communications privilege, on the other hand, it is understood, as the Wolfe
court noted, that husband and wife may communicate confidentially and effectively without the 
aid of a third party.210 Thus, while an interpreter’s presence during a communication between 
attorney and client did not destroy the privilege,211 a letter sent from a husband to his wife was 
not privileged where the wife had difficulty reading and sought assistance from a third party to  
understand the content of the letter.212 
The focus on necessity suggests that the marital communications privilege should not 
apply to spousal communications sent via Web-based email.  Certainly there are other avenues 
for spousal communication that do not require the involvement of third parties.  While 
communication by way of email may be necessary for the arms-length relationship between 
 
205 See supra notes 180 and 187 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra notes 185, 191 and 194 and accompanying text. 
209 291 U.S. at 16. 
210 Id. at 16-17. 
211 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
212 Grukley v. U.S., 394 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1968). 
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attorney and client or physician and patient, the marital relationship is something other than an 
arms-length relationship.  The marital relationship is characterized by its intimacy, and 
communication by way of email is at odds with such intimacy.   
3. Legislative Solutions 
At least three legislative enactments address whether the use of electronic communication 
should vitiate the evidentiary privileges.  Title I of the ECPA states:  “No otherwise privileged 
wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the 
provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.”213 While it may appear that this 
statute settles the question of whether emails obtained by law enforcement will retain their 
privileged status, this section of the ECPA specifically applies to Title I of the Act and not the 
Stored Communications Act, which is found in Title II of the Act.214 
Additionally, a New York statute states the following:  “No communication privileged 
under this article shall lose its privileged nature for the sole reason that it is communicated by 
electronic means or because persons necessary for the delivery or facilitation of such electronic 
communication may have access to the content of the communication.”215 California has enacted 
a statute with virtually identical language.216 
These three statutes address electronic communications and the evidentiary privileges, 
but their application is probably too broad.  Because of the differences in the nature and origins 
of the marital communications privilege as compared to the professional privileges, legislative 
enactments seeking to maintain the integrity of the all evidentiary privileges despite disclosure 
 
213 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4). 
214 See David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client Confidences by Internet E-Mail, 11 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 459, 76 (1998) (stating that Section 2517(4) does not apply to stored communications). 
215 C.P.L.R. § 4548 (McKinney 2006). 
216 See West’s Ann. Cal. Evid. Code § 917(b) (West 2006) (“A communication between persons in a relationship 
listed in subdivision (a) does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is communicated by 
electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation or storage of electronic communication 
may have access to the content of the communication.”). 
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through Web-based email fail to address the issue of whether the marital privilege should apply 
to Web-based emails.  These statutes provide a practical answer to law enforcement officers and 
the courts, but they do not answer the question of whether communication via Web-based email 
is at odds with the purpose of the marital communications privilege.  Indeed, one could argue 
that if the involvement of a third party is necessary for spouses to communicate with each other, 
then the marital communications privilege may no longer serve its intended purpose.  Thus, the 
next Section of the article will address abrogation of the marital communications privilege.  
IV. The Future of the Marital Communications Privilege 
As stated earlier, the purpose of the marital communications privilege is to promote 
marital harmony and protect marital confidences.217 Many commentators have criticized the 
marital communications privilege.  These commentators have waged a host of arguments, the 
strongest being that the privilege does not satisfy its stated purpose. 218 In determining the 
viability of the evidentiary privileges, legal scholars recognize at least two approaches.  This 
portion of the article will apply each approach to the marital communications privilege in order 
to determine whether the privilege should continue to exist.      
A. The Utilitarian Approach 
Dean Wigmore created the utilitarian, sometimes known as “instrumental”, approach.219 
Wigmore fashioned the approach as a new framework by which courts could analyze new 
privileges and re-visit existing privileges.220 According to Wigmore’s approach, four conditions 
are necessary before a court may recognize an evidentiary privilege: 
 
217 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
218 See supra notes 24 through 31 and accompanying text. 
219 Edward J. Imwinkelried, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 3.2.3 (2002). 
220 Id.
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(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that 
they will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full 
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the 
parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure of 
the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.221 
Under Wigmore’s approach, unless each of the four criteria is satisfied, then no privilege can 
exist.222 Professor Imwinkelried suggests that Wigmore intentionally created a very rigorous test 
because he advocated greater limits on the creation of new evidentiary privileges and the review 
of existing privileges.223 Wigmore’s approach has been widely accepted by the courts as the 
framework that should be used to determine whether the creation of a new privilege is 
warranted.224 The application of these criteria to the marital communications privilege provides 
insight on whether the privilege should exist.   
 The first factor is fairly subjective.  It involves a determination of whether the 
communicating spouse intended to make a confidential disclosure.  In most instances, this factor 
can be established with ease.  However, one could argue that if the communicating spouse sends 
 
221 Wigmore, supra note 22, § 2285 at 527-28. 
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223 Imwinkelried, supra note 219, at 131. 
224 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d. 1997); In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d. 
Cir. 1983); American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981); Caesar v. 
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a Web-based email to the recipient spouse, with the realization that the third party ISP will 
maintain a copy of the communication, then the communicating spouse probably did not intend 
that the communication be confidential.  On the other hand, even if the communicating spouse 
knew or should have known that the communication was not confidential, he or she may have 
possessed a subjective belief that the communication was confidential.  Thus, factor one would 
be established even if the communicating spouse disclosed confidential information via Web-
based email. 
 Wigmore’s second criterion is much more difficult to establish.  The second factor 
requires the proponent of the privilege to establish that confidentiality is essential to the 
maintenance of a good relationship between the parties.  In other words, it must be shown that, 
absent the privilege, a similarly situated person would be deterred from disclosing the 
confidential information.225 
Wigmore created the second criterion on a theory that any privilege satisfying this 
criterion would never work to block admissible evidence.  In Wigmore’s view, if it is established 
that the communications would not have been made in the absence of the privilege, then 
elimination of the privilege would likely result in the communicator’s decision not to disclose the 
information:  “In short, there is an evidentiary wash – while evidence might be excluded at trial 
pursuant to a privilege objection, but for the privilege the evidence would not have come into 
existence.”226 The U.S. Supreme Court agrees with this approach.  In Swidler & Berlin v. 
U.S.,227 a case involving the attorney-client privilege, the Court noted that clients would 
 
225 Imwinkelried, supra note 219, at 132.  See also Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (noting that privileges 
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probably not share confidential information with their attorneys in the absence of the privilege, 
thereby making “the loss of evidence [ ] more apparent than real.”228 
Many commentators have argued that the marital communications privilege fails 
Wigmore’s second criterion because most spouses do not confide in each other due to the 
existence of the marital communications privilege.229 Rather, spouses confide in each other due 
to the trust and affection present in the relationship.230 As one commentator notes: 
[T]he contingency of courtroom disclosure would almost never 
(even if the privilege did not exist) be in the minds of the parties in 
considering how far they should go in their secret conversations.  
What encourages them to fullest frankness is not the assurance of 
courtroom privilege, but the trust they place in the loyalty and 
discretion of each other. . . .  In the lives of most people 
appearance in court as a party or a witness is an exceedingly rare 
and unusual event, and the anticipation of it is not one of those 
factors which materially influence[s] in daily life the degree  of 
fullness of marital disclosures.231 
Indeed, commentators have noted that no evidence exists to suggest that married lawyers, who 
are aware of the marital communications privilege, enjoy more marital bliss than uninformed 
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laypersons.232 Apparently, Wigmore agreed with this analysis, arguing that no persuasive data 
showed that the recognition of the privilege is necessary to facilitate communications between 
spouses.233 Therefore, with regard to Wigmore’s second criterion, “while the danger of injustice 
from suppression of relevant proof is clear and certain, the probable benefits of the rule of 
privilege in encouraging marital confidences and wedded harmony are marginal.”234 
Wigmore’s third criterion requires that the advocate of the privilege show that the 
relation is one that, in the opinion of the community, should be “sedulously fostered”.  In order 
to satisfy this criterion, the advocate of the privilege must show that society places a high degree 
of value on the relationship that the privilege seeks to protect.235 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the marital relationship as one worth protecting, 
finding marriage to be “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would 
be neither civilization nor progress.”236 Indeed, the Court has described the marital relationship 
as the most important relationship in life.237 The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized 
society’s interest in the protecting the privacy of the marital relationship.  In Griswold v.
Connecticut,238 the Court stated that it found “repulsive” the idea of allowing the government to 
search “the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom”.239 Considering the value that the High 
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Court places on the institution of marriage, it may make sense that confidential communications 
between spouses should be protected.    
Wigmore’s final criterion requires proof that the injury to the relationship which would 
result from disclosure of the communication is greater than the benefit gained from disclosure of 
the communication.  The analysis of Wigmore’s second criterion is important in the analysis of 
the fourth criterion.  If, as the second criterion requires, the existence of the privilege is essential 
to the proper functioning of the relationship that is to be protected, then it follows that the 
relationship would suffer severely from the disclosure of confidential information.  If, on the 
other hand, the privilege has no effect on whether the parties to the relationship engage in 
confidential communications, then the disclosure of confidential information would not cause an 
injury to the relationship that is greater than the benefit that the justice system and society at 
large would gain from the disclosure of the information.    
With regard to the marital privilege, it is very likely that Wigmore’s second and fourth 
criteria cannot be established.  Wigmore’s utilitarian or instrumental approach is based on the 
idea that the evidentiary privileges should exist only as an instrument or a means to accomplish 
another goal.240 Specifically, Wigmore felt that evidentiary privileges should be recognized only 
where they are “a necessary means of promoting a valuable, confidential social relation.”241 
Because the marital communications privilege is not necessary to the promotion of the marital 
relationship, the privilege should not exist based on Wigmore’s approach. 
While Wigmore’s utilitarian model is widely accepted by the courts, it is not without its 
critics.  Indeed, Wigmore himself questioned whether the utilitarian model would support the 
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case for a spousal privilege.242 However, rather than arguing for abrogation of the marital 
communications privilege, it has been argued that a different model should be applied in hopes 
of justifying the privilege’s existence. 
B. The Humanistic Approach 
 The humanistic approach to the evidentiary privileges suggests that privileges should 
exist, not to affect the communicator’s behavior, but to protect certain personal rights such as  
informational privacy or individual autonomy.243 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that 
the constitutional right to privacy may protect “the individual interest in avoiding the disclosure 
of personal matters” as well as “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”244 The humanistic approach has moral underpinnings.  Its promoters argue 
that certain concepts, namely privacy and autonomy, must be safeguarded despite the effect that 
the exercise of these rights might have on the admissibility of relevant evidence.   
1. The Informational Privacy Approach 
 The first rationale for the humanistic approach to the evidentiary privileges involves the 
idea of informational privacy.  According to Professor Imwinkelried, “the immediate result of 
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denying a privilege is a loss of informational privacy.”245 Thus, the humanistic approach 
suggests that the evidentiary privileges exist to protect every person’s right to confide in certain 
people without fear that the government will compel disclosure of the information.246 
Applying the informational privacy rationale to the marital communications privilege, it 
is clear that the privilege should exist to protect one’s right to confide privately in his or her 
spouse.  As an expression of his opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505, which 
would have abolished the marital communications privilege while codifying the spousal 
testimonial privilege,247 Professor Black drafted a letter to a Congressperson in 1973.248 In the 
letter, Professor Black argued that abrogation of the marital communications privilege would 
result in the violation of each spouse’s right to privacy:   
[T]he meaning of the Rule (made entirely clear in the Advisory 
Committee’s comments) is that, however intimate, however 
private, however embarrassing may be a disclosure by one spouse 
to another, or some fact discovered, within the privacies of 
marriage, by one spouse about another, that disclosure or fact can 
be wrung from the spouse under penalty of being held in contempt 
of court, if it is thought barely relevant to the issues of anybody’s 
lawsuit for breach of a contract to sell a carload of apples. . . .  It 
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seems clear to me that this Rule trenches on the area of marital 
privacy so staunchly defended by the Supreme Court . . . .249 
The informational privacy approach promotes the idea that everyone has the right to confide in 
certain persons without fear of disclosure to outsiders.  Considering the value that society and the 
courts place on the marital relationship, it stands to reason that private information shared 
between spouses should be protected by an evidentiary privilege.  Thus, the informational 
privacy rationale supports the continued existence of the marital communications privilege. 
2. The Individual Autonomy Approach 
 A second rationale for the humanistic approach is the concept of individual autonomy or 
decisional privacy.250 Under this rationale, the evidentiary privileges should exist to help a 
person “effectively exercise autonomy by facilitating intelligent, independent life preference 
choices.”251 The existence of certain evidentiary privileges will arguably promote autonomy by 
allowing individuals the ability to freely consult confidants about “fundamental life choices” 
without fear of government intrusion.252 Thus, if a particular evidentiary privilege promotes 
such free-flowing communication, then the humanistic approach supports its existence.  For 
example, it has been argued that the attorney-client privilege promotes individual autonomy in 
the following manner:  “Ready access to legal champions can empower individuals without legal 
training to assert and defend their rights. Making communications privileged ensures that the 
dialogue between the attorney and client is frank and encourages individuals to explore their 
legal options with an advisor.”253 
249 Id. at 48. 
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In order to determine if a particular privilege will facilitate intelligent, independent 
choices, the proponents of the individual autonomy approach have created a three-factor test.  
According to the test, courts must determine:   
(1)  whether the relation is a consultative one;  
(2)  whether there is a relatively firm societal understanding 
that the consultant’s duty is to help the other person pursue 
his or her interests and make a choice; and  
(3)  whether the consultative relationship is centered on choices 
in an area of the person’s life implicating a fundamental life 
choice.254 
These three criteria are problematic when applied to the marital communications 
privilege.  The first criterion requires that the relationship be a consultative one.  While it is true 
that a marriage sometimes may be a consultative relationship, it is not inherently consultative as 
are the relationships between attorney-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient and 
clergy-communicant.  In order to determine if this first criterion has been satisfied, courts would 
be forced to inquire into the nature of the specific communication at issue in order to determine 
if the communicating spouse was seeking consultation.  Traditionally, courts have been reluctant 
to delve into the content of a private communication between spouses.255 Instead, courts prefer 
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an absolute rule that confidential communications between spouses will be considered 
privileged, as this approach provides a measure of security to married couples that “their private 
communications will be protected and will not be susceptible to exposure by an after-the-fact 
determination . . . .”256 Therefore, even if the first criterion of the individual autonomy approach 
calls for recognition of the marital communications privilege, the privilege might not apply 
depending on the communicating spouse’s purpose, thereby making the privilege qualified or 
conditional rather than absolute.257 
The second criterion of the individual autonomy approach is also problematic when 
applied to the marital communications privilege.  The second criterion requires a firm societal 
understanding that the consultant’s duty is to help the other person pursue his or her interests and 
make a choice.  With regard to the professional privileges, this criterion can be established with 
ease.  In the context of each of the professional privileges, society has accepted the idea that the 
professional in the relationship has a duty to advise the layperson and possibly assist the 
layperson in making a decision.  Any contractual relationship between the professional and the 
layperson regarding payment for services rendered would only buttress the existence of such a  
duty.  The professional relationships are fiduciary in nature in that “confidence is reposed on one 
side, and domination and influence result on the other.”258 In each of the professional 
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relationships, the professional has undertaken a fiduciary duty to act primarily for the benefit of 
the layperson.259 
In contrast, many courts have held that the marital relationship is not inherently 
fiduciary.260 These courts have held that a marriage is not inherently fiduciary because kinship 
alone is not enough to create the protected relationship.261 Thus, “more than a gratuitous reposal 
of a secret to another who happens to be a family member is required to establish a fiduciary or 
similar relationship of trust and confidence.”262 Additionally, most fiduciary relationships are 
based on an imbalance of knowledge and influence between the parties.263 In the context of the 
attorney-client relationship, for example, the attorney is typically more knowledgeable about the 
law and, as a consequence, will wield a great amount of influence with the layperson in making 
certain decisions.  In contrast, the modern conceptualization of marriage is based on mutual trust, 
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commitment and decision-making.264 While one spouse may be more knowledgeable than the 
other, such an imbalance is not inherent to the relationship.  As a result, it makes sense that no 
fiduciary duty should exist between spouses unless they have entered into some other transaction 
that gives rise to the duty.  The second criterion of the individual autonomy approach requires 
society’s recognition that one party must subordinate his or her own interests to those of the 
other party.  While society may be prepared to make such a recognition with regard to certain 
professional relationships, the same cannot be said for the marital relationship.265 As such, the 
marital communications privilege is not supported by the second criterion. 
Finally, the third criterion of the individual autonomy approach requires that the 
protected relationship be centered on choices related to a fundamental life preference.  In other 
words, this third criterion requires that the parties utilize the privilege to make choices and 
decisions about areas of one’s life that deserve constitutional protection.266 For example, where 
a penitent consults a priest for assistance in making independent choices about constitutionally 
protected religious practices, then the clergy-communicant privilege would satisfy this third 
criterion.    
The marital communications privilege does satisfy the third criterion, but, once again, the 
inquiry is content-based, thereby making the privilege qualified rather than absolute.267 The 
third criterion would be satisfied where one spouse consults the other regarding constitutionally 
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protected choices.  In the context of the familial relationship, such constitutionally protected 
choices include decisions related to “marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships 
and child rearing and education.”268 Therefore, if marital communications relate to these 
constitutionally protected areas, then the individual autonomy approach suggests that the 
privilege should protect disclosure of such statements.  However, where the communications 
relate to the commission of a crime, as is the case with many privileged communications 
between spouses, none of these constitutionally protected areas is implicated.  Because the 
rationale behind the individual autonomy approach breaks down depending on the content of the 
communication, this approach would create a qualified marital communications privilege and 
force courts to examine the content of the communication before determining whether the 
privilege should attach. 
Additional problems exist when the individual autonomy approach is applied to the 
marital communications privilege.  The proponents of this approach argue that an evidentiary 
privilege should exist only if it promotes free-flowing communication regarding important life 
choices.  However, as established in an earlier portion of this article, it is very likely that the 
marital privilege does little to encourage confidential communications between spouses.269 
Thus, abrogation of the rule would probably not affect the free-flowing communication that the 
individual autonomy rationale seeks to promote.  In a sense, the utilitarian approach and the 
individual autonomy approach are quite similar.  Each approach posits that an evidentiary 
privilege should exist only where its abrogation would affect the flow of confidential 
communication.  Because abrogation of the marital communications privilege would probably 
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not affect the flow of confidential communications between spouses, both the utilitarian and 
individual autonomy approaches call for abolishment of the privilege. 
The informational privacy approach is the only approach that supports the existence of 
the marital communications privilege, but the relationship between informational privacy and the 
marital communications privilege is quite strong.  Rather than stating that the evidentiary 
privileges should only exist if they will affect the flow of communication between the parties to 
certain protected relationships, the informational privacy approach recognizes that it is morally 
repugnant to require the disclosure of certain private information or to force an otherwise honest 
and decent person to choose between betraying his or her spouse, lying or going to jail.270 To be 
sure, many commentators argue that the informational privacy approach to the marital 
communications privilege is a qualified one.  It has been argued that the need for privacy in the 
marital relationship should give way “where there is a need for otherwise unobtainable evidence 
critical to the ascertainment of significant legal rights.”271 While this approach would not cause 
courts to review the content of the confidential communication, it would force courts to consider 
whether the privilege should attach to the communication in light of one party’s need for the 
evidence.  In other contexts, lower courts recognizing a right to informational privacy have 
required disclosure of the private information where the government’s interest is sufficiently 
compelling.272 
Because courts have exclusively relied upon the utilitarian approach to justify the 
evidentiary privileges, it is very unlikely that they would employ either of the humanistic 
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approaches.273 Even if courts decide to rely upon the informational privacy rationale as a 
justification for the marital communications privilege, it is very unlikely that a change in the 
absolute nature of the privilege would follow.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “[A]n 
uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all.”274 
The recognition of the marital communications privilege is justified under at least the 
informational privacy approach, and, for the time being, the privilege will remain absolute in 
nature.  This article will conclude with a look at whether the use of Web-based email supports 
the informational privacy rationale behind the marital communications privilege. 
V. Conclusion 
As stated earlier, the information privacy approach posits that marital 
communications should be protected because it is morally distasteful to force one spouse to 
betray the other.  This approach stands for the proposition that the confidential nature of the 
marital relationship should not be violated by the government’s search for evidence.  The 
informational privacy approach recognizes the marital relationship as an intrinsically private 
one and protects private marital communications, not to encourage greater communication 
between spouses, but because it is the right thing to do.   
The informational privacy approach does not support the view that communications 
sent via Web-based email should be protected by the marital communications privilege.  The 
informational privacy approach seeks to prevent the government from forcing one spouse to 
turn on the other or face a contempt charge.  If, however, a third party discloses the 
communication and testifies regarding its content, then no betrayal between the spouses 
would result.  Additionally, forcing an ISP to disclose the content of the communication 
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would not violate the confidential nature of the marital relationship because the 
communicating spouse chose to sacrifice the confidentiality of the communication by 
sending it over the internet and storing it on the server of a third party.  The outcome would 
be no different if the communicating spouse chose to send a postcard to his spouse via a 
messenger wherein the communicating spouse had contractually agreed to allow the 
messenger access to the content of the postcard.  If the messenger exercises his legal right to 
review the content of the postcard, there would be no violation of the informational privacy 
rights of the spouses.  Finally, protecting from disclosure communication sent via Web-based 
email may not be the right thing to do.  The marital relationship is unique in that only two 
people are required for it to function properly.  The professional relationships will sometimes 
call for the necessary involvement of third parties in order for effective communication to 
occur, but the marital relationship has no such requirement.  Spouses have various means of 
communication that do not require the involvement of a third party who is a stranger to the 
relationship.  If a communicating spouse either inadvertently or intentionally decides to 
involve a third party in otherwise confidential communications with his or her spouse, then it 
is not morally abhorrent to require the third party to disclose the content of the 
communication.   
While this conclusion may be troublesome to some readers, it is no different from 
concluding that one should not confidentially communicate with his or her spouse via a 
bullhorn, an office intercom, a recorded prison telephone line or in an internet chat room.  In 
any of these instances, Big Brother may be listening, and, if he is, he should be allowed to 
disclose the content of the conversation. 
 
